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Abstract 
 
This paper develops the generalised Nash bargaining solution for a bargaining co-
operative selling its raw output to a single processor. Three assumptions for co-
operative member behaviour are examined: profit maximisation, co-operative surplus 
maximisation and maximising members’ price.  Solutions are compared and 
comparative statics presented for these alternative assumptions and two model types, 
price bargaining with a given quantity and simultaneous price and quantity 
bargaining.  The most striking feature of the results is that the objective of 
maximising members’ price does not necessarily lead to the highest members’ price. 
Even in the exogenous quantity model, reducing output does not necessarily increase 
members’ price.  These findings question the relevance of co-operative members 
seeking to maximise members’ price when trading with a single processor. 
 iii
Contents 
 
About ACCORD            ii 
About the Author            ii 
Abstract            iii 
1. Introduction             1 
2. Co-operative Theoretical and Bargaining Framework       2 
3. Price Bargaining with Fixed Quantity         4 
4. Price and Quantity Bargaining          8 
5. Conclusion           15 
References           17 
Appendix           18 
Endnotes           19 
 
 iv
1. Introduction 
 
There exists a body of literature on the neo-classical theory of the co-operative firm.  
Two streams of literature exist, one examines agricultural supply and marketing co-
operatives, see for example Helmberger and Hoos (1962), Ladd (1974) and LeVay 
(1983).  The other stream focuses upon worker co-operatives or labour managed 
firms, see for example, Ward (1958) and Meade (1974).  In part, the literature focuses 
upon price and output solutions under varying market conditions and differing 
behavioural assumptions for co-operatives and their members.  One circumstance 
which has received relatively little attention in the theoretical literature however, is 
the bilateral monopoly case where a co-operative bargains with a single trader over 
sale conditions.  This paper attempts to fill this gap and seeks to provide a thorough 
theoretical examination of the bargaining co-operative. 
 
In particular, we focus on agricultural bargaining co-operatives and associations who 
negotiate, on behalf of member farmers, with food processors over price and quantity 
for raw agricultural output.  Numerous examples of bargaining co-operatives exist in 
U.S. agriculture for products such as: wine grapes, potatoes, poultry, sugar beet and 
milk, (Hueth and Marcoul, 2003).  In Australia bargaining occurs for milk, chicken 
meat, tobacco leaf and wine grapes, (Oczkowski, 2004). Recent changes in Australian 
trade practices legalisation are likely to see the further development of collective 
bargaining over agricultural produce. 
 
This paper develops the generalised Nash bargaining solution for a bargaining co-
operative selling its raw output to a single processor.  Consistent with the neo-
classical co-operative literature (Bateman, Edwards and LeVay, 1979), various 
solutions are developed and compared for differing behavioural assumptions for the 
co-operative and its members.   
 
In the next section we setup the theoretical framework by describing the relations 
between the co-operative and its members, and then outline the generalised Nash 
bargaining model.  Section three examines the specific case of price bargaining with a 
given quantity, comparing various solutions and outlining the comparative statics 
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results.  Section four considers the more general case of price and quantity bargaining.  
Section five draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Co-operative Theoretical and Bargaining Framework 
 
Bateman, Edwards and LeVay (1979) describe and compare the various behavioural 
assumptions which have been employed for developing theoretical models of co-
operatives.  Assumptions are made for the behaviour of both the co-operative and its 
members.  The dominant body of literature stems from the seminal Helmberger and 
Hoos (1962) who consider the marketing co-operative as one who processes raw 
farmer output and then sells the processed output to the market.  In contrast, we 
abstract from processing co-operatives and assume that the co-operative acts only as a 
bargaining agent.  This permits us to focus on issues relating to bargaining only and is 
consistent with many U.S. and Australian agricultural bargaining co-operatives and 
associations. Effectively members produce the output for which the co-operative 
negotiates sale conditions. 
 
Following Helmberger and Hoos (1962) assume that the co-operative only exists for 
the members and hence makes no profit ( 0=ΠC ). All of the co-operative surplus 
(CS) is returned to members ( YPCS M= ), where Y is output and  is the per-unit 
price returned to members1.  The co-operative faces fixed bargaining costs (B) which 
members incur if negotiations reach agreement.  Bargaining costs typically relate to 
the hiring of specific expertise to conduct negotiations and hence are unrelated with 
output.  The comparative statics analysis which will be presented, investigates how 
changes in these costs impact on solutions. 
MP
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With these assumptions define the co-operative profit function as: 
0=−−=Π YPBYPC MY          (1) 
 
where,  is the market price for the output. YP
 
Define the co-operative surplus function as: 
YPBYPCS MY =−=           (2) 
 
which implies, , that is, the members’ price is the market price less 
the average bargaining cost. 
)/( YBPP YM −=
 
Define the members’ profit function as: 
),(),( WYCBYPWYCYPM YM −−=−=Π        (3) 
 
where C(Y,W) defines total production costs which depend on output and factor input 
prices W. 
 
Define the processor’s profit function as: 
YPYRP Y−=Π )(           (4) 
 
where R(Y) defines the processor’s revenue function. 
 
The alternative behavioural assumptions relate to members’ behaviour.  We consider 
three of the most common assumptions employed in the literature, see Bateman, 
Edwards and LeVay (1979) for a motivation for these assumptions: 1) maximise 
members’ profits ( MΠ ); 2) maximise the co-operative surplus or members’ total 
revenue (CS); 3) maximise the average per-unit return to members ( = CS/Y).  In a 
broad sense, assuming the co-operative sells into a competitive market with a 
downward sloping demand curve, objective 3) produces the lowest output level but 
highest market price, objective 2) the highest output level and lowest price, while 
output and price fall in-between these extremes for objective 1).  Effectively, 
maximising members’ price is achieved by restricting output, while maximising co-
MP
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operative surplus is a growth objective producing a larger output level and a 
consequence lower price. 
 
In all subsequent models we make use of the generalised Nash bargaining model 
(Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986).  In addition to the standard axomatic 
foundation of the Nash (1950) program, solutions from the generalised framework are 
also consistent with various strategic models of bargaining with alternative offers 
(Rubinstein, 1982). In particular, asymmetric bargaining strengths are permitted and 
these can be related to players’ traits such as their levels of risk aversion and 
impatience (Muthoo, 1999, chs 3-4). 
 
For all bargaining models we assume the Nash disagreement point is a zero payoff for 
both the co-operative and processor2.  The impasse point is the status quo, players will 
not trade if it makes them worse off given their objective.  We assume that outside 
options, available during negotiations, are available but these are not attractive.  That 
is, the outside options are worse positions than the Nash solution and hence will not 
constrain the Nash solution (Muthoo, 1999 ch 5).  
 
We consider two general classes of models. First models where only price bargaining 
occurs for a given fixed output. Second, we consider the longer-run situation where 
bargaining occurs over both price and quantity. For each of these model classes we 
consider the three alternative members’ objectives and assume that the processor 
always maximises profit. 
 
 
3. Price Bargaining with Fixed Quantity 
 
A survey of U.S. bargaining co-operatives and associations (Iskow and Sexton, 1992) 
showed that while all associations negotiated price, only 25% of associations 
negotiated on the quantity of the commodity.  For more than 70% of associations, 
quantity is determined prior to price negotiations and either the processor purchases 
all the association’s production or quantity is based on the processor’s needs.  Given 
this recognition we initially consider the generalised Nash program for a fixed output 
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(Y ) to determine the bargained . Assuming a zero disagreement point and 
maximising members’ profits (
YP
MΠ ), the Nash bargaining program is: 
 
)1()1( )}({)}({)()( ττττ −− −−=ΠΠ= YY PARYATCPYPMFMax     (5) 
 
where τ )10( ≤≤ τ  measures the bargaining strength of the co-operative and τ = 0.5 
implies equal bargaining power. AR (= R(Y)/Y) is average revenue and ATC (= {B + 
C(Y,W)}/Y) is average total cost. 
 
The solution to (5) is: 
ATCARPY )1( ττ −+=    and   ACABARPM )1()( ττ −+−=     (6) 
 
The generalised Nash framework predicts that price is indeterminate. The bargained 
price falls between an upper limit determined by the processor’s average revenue and 
a lower limit determined by the co-operative’s average total cost, the latter includes 
both bargaining and production costs.  Determinate price depends upon the bargaining 
strength of players.  
 
As previously indicated the solution encapsulates Nash’s (1950) axioms of, Pareto-
optimality, rational and fully knowledgeable players.  The measure of the co-
operative’s bargaining strength (τ) however, can be related to some of the co-
operative’s relative (to the processor) traits.  These predictions are based on game 
theoretic strategic models of bargaining.  Some theoretical findings (Sexton 1994, 
Muthoo 1999) include: the more patient the co-operative the higher the price; the 
more risk adverse the co-operative the lower the price; if the co-operative makes the 
first offer price is higher; and bargaining strength is unaffected by the existence of 
less attractive outside voluntary outside trades. 
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If we next assume members wish to maximise the co-operative surplus (CS) the 
program is: 
 
)1()1( )}({)}({)()( ττττ −− −−=Π= YY PARYABPYPCSFMax     (7) 
 
where AB (=B/Y) is average bargaining cost. 
 
The solution to (7) is: 
ABARPY )1( ττ −+=    and   )( ABARPM −=τ       (8) 
 
Here the solution is identical to (6) but for the average costs determining the co-
operative’s lower limit.  In this case average bargaining costs determine the lower 
limit, production costs play no role. Here members’ price is equal to the proportion of 
the available per unit bargaining pie (AR – AB) going to the co-operative. 
 
Finally, if we assume members wish to maximise average returns ( ) the program 
is: 
MP
 
)1()1( )}({}{)()( ττττ −− −−=Π= YYM PARYABPPPFMax      (9) 
 
The solution to (9) is also given by equation (8). This is expected, since for a given 
fixed quantity, maximising members’ total revenue is equivalent to maximising 
member price.  
 
It is clear that for a given Y  and τ (since ATC > AB) the bargained output price is 
higher for maximising MΠ  than for maximising CS or .  This also implies that 
the price returned to members is also higher for maximising 
MP
MΠ  than for 
maximising CS or . The fact that the objective of maximising  does not result 
in the highest  for members appears perverse and is the outcome of the bargaining 
process.  It results from the absence of production costs in the explicit = -AB 
objective.  For the 
MP MP
MP
MP YP
MΠ  maximising objective, both production and bargaining costs 
determine the lower limit from which bargaining is bound, this results in a higher 
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output price and hence a higher members’ price.  Even though the maximising  
objective seeks to gain the highest member per unit returns, it does not because the 
objective implies it will trade as long as only average bargaining costs are covered3.  
In the standard model, where the co-operative can sell its output anywhere along a 
downward sloping demand curve (Bateman, Edwards and LeVay, 1979) a higher 
results from maximising  rather than 
MP
MP MP MΠ  because quantity varies and is 
smaller for the maximising assumption.  In this bargaining model quantity is 
exogenous, and is assumed to be equal in these comparisons.  
MP
 
We present in table 1 the comparative statics4 for the key endogenous variables, MΠ , 
CS, and  given changes in the exogenous variables, τ, B, Y  and W.  Where 
possible, the signs for the partial derivatives have been provided.  Irrespective of 
optimising objective, increasing the bargaining strength of the co-operative increases 
the objective value and market and member prices.  Interestingly, higher bargaining 
costs, decrease objective values and members’ prices, but increase market prices.  
Effectively, the burden of higher bargaining costs is shared by co-operative members 
and the processor.  Similarly, higher factor input prices lead to a lower profit for 
members but higher market prices for the processor. 
YP MP
 
Table 1: Comparative Statics for Price Bargaining Models* 
 
Objective 
Max MΠ  
 
τ 
 
B 
 
Y 
 
W 
MΠ  0)( >− ATCARY  0<−τ  )( YY CR −τ  0<− WCτ  
YP  0)( >− ATCAR  0/)1( >− Yτ  YCRPC YYYY /)]()[( −+− τ  0/)1( >− YCWτ  
MP  0)( >− ATCAR  0/ <− Yτ  YCRPCAB YYYY /)]()([ −+−+ τ  0/)1( >− YCWτ  
     
Objective 
Max CS 
 
τ 
 
B 
 
Y 
 
W 
CS 0)( >− ABARY  0<−τ  0>YRτ  0 
YP  0)( >− ABAR  0/)1( >− Yτ  ))(/1( YY PRY −τ < 0 0 
MP  0)( >− ABAR  0/ <− Yτ  ))(/1( YY PRABY −+τ  0 
* Results for Max  are identical to those for Max CS. MP
 
The impact of changes in output are generally less clear.  For the profit maximising 
objective, comparative statics result depend, among other things, upon the output 
level.  For low output (MR > MC) higher Y leads to lower profits, a lower market 
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price and (if B < ))(( YYYY CPRCY −+−τ ) a lower member price.  Conversely, for 
high output levels (MR < MC) higher Y leads to higher profits and possibly lower 
market and member prices. For the maximising CS and  objectives, a higher Y 
does increase the objective value for CS and reduce market prices, and (if B < 
MP
)( YY RPY τ− ) reduce member prices. 
 
The most interesting aspects of the comparative statics results is that reducing output 
does not necessarily increase the price returned to members, for all objectives.  For 
maximising profits, a lower output produces a higher member price only if the current 
output level is relatively high and the bargaining cost is relatively low.  For the CS 
and  objectives, a lower output produces a higher member price only if the 
bargaining cost is relatively low. 
MP
 
 
4. Price and Quantity Bargaining 
 
In the longer term it is clear that some type of agreement on quantity must also be 
reached by players to support an ongoing trading relationship.  One cannot expect, for 
example, a processor to continually purchase more than it desires given a prolonged 
period of excess supply for the processed output in the market.  To this end it is 
important to consider the generalised Nash program for jointly determining the 
bargained output (Y) and price ( ).  YP
 
For maximising members’ profits ( MΠ ) the program is defined by (5) with a price 
solution given by (6) and quantity given by: 
 
)/()( YY ARATCATCARY −−=   or    YY RC =                (10) 
 
where, the Y subscripts on the cost and revenue variables denote partial derivatives 
with respect to Y.  
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Thus, price remains indeterminate lying between average revenue and average total 
cost, but AR and ATC are now evaluated at a quantity consistent with the intersection 
of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves.  This is the standard bilateral 
monopoly solution, see for example, Blair, Kaserman and Romano (1989). 
 
For maximising co-operative surplus (CS) the Nash program is (7) with a price 
solution of (8) and quantity solution of: 
 
)/()( YY ARABABARY −−=   or    0=YR                 (11) 
 
Again the only difference between the profit and surplus maximising models is the 
average total cost in the profit maximising model and the use of only average 
bargaining costs in the surplus maximising model. Here, setting marginal revenue to 
zero determines quantity. 
 
Finally, for maximising  the Nash program is (9) with a price solution of (8) and a 
quantity solution of: 
MP
 
)/())(1( YY ARABABARY −−−= τ   or   )( ABARRY −=τ               (12) 
 
In this case  and ABRP YY += YM RP = . Interestingly, for maximising members’ 
price, both the price and quantity are indeterminate and depend upon the bargaining 
strength of players (τ). If τ = 0 and no co-operative bargaining strength, then  
determines Y, and if τ = 1 the co-operative has complete bargaining strength then no 
trade occurs Y = 0. 
0=YR
 
Direct comparisons between the price and quantity solutions are not possible given 
that a general closed form solution for quantity does not exist for (10) - (12).  
However, we will consider a specific functional form for costs and revenues, to 
illustrate a closed form quantity solution and to make comments about the relative 
positions of price and quantity solutions for the three alternative assumptions. 
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Consider the following quadratic forms for production costs and revenues: 
 
2
27
2
16214231210
2
21
2
50
, wcwcwwcwcwcccwhere
YrYrRYcYcC
+++++=
+=+=
              (13) 
 
It is assumed that there exist two normal factor inputs and given the other standard 
properties (see the appendix) of the cost and revenue functions we have: 
.0,0,0,0,0,0,0 2176540 <><<>>> rrccccc   These functions imply linear 
average and marginal revenue and production cost curves. 
 
The closed form quantity solutions for equations (10), (11) and (12) respectively are:  
Y( MΠ ) = Y(CS) = );(2/)( 2501 rccr −− ;2/ 21 rr−  and Y( ) = MP .2/)1( 21 rrτ−−  
Simple comparisons confirm that, Y(CS) > Y( MΠ ) and Y(CS)  Y( ), but the 
relation between Y(
≥ MP
MΠ ) and Y( ) depends upon bargaining strength.  At the 
extremes τ = 0 ⇒  Y(
MP
MΠ ) < Y( ) and τ = 1  Y(MP ⇒ MΠ ) > Y( ). Thus output is 
highest with maximising co-operative surplus, but is not necessarily lowest for 
maximising members’ price, for very weak co-operative bargaining strength (
MP
0→τ ) 
output is lowest for profit maximisation. 
 
For market prices and a given τ, )()( MPCSP YY Π<  and )()( MYY PPCSP ≤ , but again 
the relation between and depends upon bargaining strength.  At the 
extremes τ = 0  > and τ = 1 ⇒  
)( MPY Π )( MY PP
⇒ )( MPY Π )( MY PP )( MPY Π < . Thus market 
price is lowest with maximising co-operative surplus, but is not necessarily highest for 
maximising members’ price, for very weak co-operative bargaining strength (
)( MY PP
0→τ ) 
market price is highest for profit maximisation.  The relations between members’ 
prices for the three solutions are the same as for market prices, that is,  is lowest 
for the maximising CS objective and the highest price depends upon bargaining 
strength, with high τ implying >
MP
)( MM PP )( MPM Π  and low τ < . )( MM PP )( MPM Π
 
For illustrative purposes we present the solutions graphically.  Figure 1 depicts the 
output solutions and limits (  upper limit and  lower limit) for market price UP LP
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bargaining. The output solutions are consistent with MC = MR for Y( MΠ ) and MR = 
0 for Y(CS). The depicted circumstance assumes that τ is suitably low so that 
Y( MΠ ) < Y( ).  The upper and lower bargaining limits reflect: 
 
MP
).()()( CSPPPMP YMYY >>Π
 
Figure 1: Price Bargaining Limits 
 
Price 
MC 
 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of market and members’ prices for the three solutions 
for a given τ.  The F functions are employed to depict the various price solutions: 
ACABFF )1(41 τ−++= , ABFF += 42 , ACFF )1(43 τ−+=  and )(4 ABARF −= τ . 
 determines ,  determines and ,  determines 
, and  determines and .  Since (1 – τ) AC > 0 and AB > 
0, then  is the highest curve,  is the lowest curve and  can be above or below 
. Again the depicted circumstance assumes that τ is suitably low so that Y(
1F )( MPY Π 2F )(CSPY )( MY PP 3F
)( MPM Π 4F )(CSPM )( MM PP
1F 4F 2F
3F MΠ ) < 
MR 
YY(Πm) Y(Pm) Y(cs) 
Pu(Πm) 
Pu(Pm) 
Pu(cs) 
PL (Πm) 
PL(Pm) 
PL(cs) 
AR
ATC
AB
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Y( ) but here using equation (12), Y( ) is determined by the intersection between 
MR and .  
MP MP
4F
 
Figure 2:  Bargaining Market and Member Prices 
 
 
In summary, for maximising members’ profits, Y is determined by MC = MR and  
and , determine market and members’ price respectively.  For the co-operative 
surplus maximising objective, Y is determined by MR = 0 and  and , determine 
market and members’ price respectively.  For the members’ price maximising 
objective, Y is determined by the intersection of MR and ,and  and , 
determine market and members’ price respectively.5  
1F
3F
2F 4F
4F 2F 4F
 
We present in table 2 the comparative statics for the key endogenous variables, MΠ , 
CS, Y, and  given changes in the exogenous variables, τ, B and W.  Where YP MP
F1 
F2 
F4 
F3 
Price 
MC 
MR 
YY(Π m) Y(Pm) Y(cs) 
Py(Πm) 
Py(Pm) 
Pm(Πm) 
Py(cs) 
Pm(Pm) 
Pm(cs) 
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possible, the signs for the partial derivatives have been provided.  As with the 
exogenous output case, increasing the bargaining strength of the co-operative, 
increases objective values and prices for all maximising objectives.  For the 
maximising  objective, a higher τ reduces output.  The impact of bargaining costs 
is similar to the exogenous quantity case for the 
MP
MΠ  and CS objectives, but differs 
for the objective where the impact of higher bargaining costs on market prices 
depends upon the level of bargaining costs with low costs (B <  ) 
leading to higher market prices.  Conversely, for a high level of bargaining costs, 
increasing bargaining costs further reduces market prices. Higher bargaining costs 
increase output levels for the  objective only. 
MP
)1()/( 2 −ττ YYRY
MP
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Table 2: Comparative Statics for Price and Quantity Bargaining Models 
 
Objective
Max MΠ
 
τ 
 
B 
 
W 
MΠ  0)( >− ATCARY  0<−τ  0<− WCτ  
YP  0)( >− ATCAR  0/)1( >− Yτ  )}(/)({}/)1{( YYYYYYYWW RCYCPCYC −−+−τ  
MP  0)( >− ATCAR  0/ <− Yτ  )}(/)({}/)1{( YYYYYYYWW RCYABCPCYC −−−+−τ  
Y   0 0 )/( YYYYYW RCC −− < 0 
    
Objective
Max CS 
 
τ 
 
B 
 
W 
CS 0)( >− ABARY  0<−τ  0 
YP  0)( >− ABAR  0/)1( >− Yτ  0 
MP  0)( >− ABAR  0/ <− Yτ  0 
Y    0 0 0
    
Objective
Max  MP
 
τ 
 
B 
 
W 
MP  0}/)({)( >−+− JABARABAR τ 0)./()/( 2 <−− JYY ττ  0 
YP  0
)(
))(( >−−−
−−−
YYYY
YYY
ARABR
ABRABAR
τ  ))(1(
)1(
ABARJ
ABR YYY
−−
+−−
τ
ττ
 
0 
Y 
0
)(
)( <−−−
−
YYYY ARABR
ARAB
τ  0))(1( >−− ABARJ τ
τ
 
0 
 
where )/()}({ YYYYYY ARABARABRJ −−−−= τ  
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Changes in factor input prices again only affect the profit maximising objective.  
Higher factor prices reduce member profits and increase prices if bargaining strength 
is relatively high.  Increasing W, leads to higher market prices if τ is such that 
 and to higher member prices if YY CP > )( ABCP YY +> . 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed bargaining co-operatives price and quantity solutions under 
alternative behavioural assumptions employing the generalised Nash bargaining 
solution.  The most striking feature of the results relate to the objective maximising 
members average returns . The bargaining strength of the co-operative impacts 
upon both output and prices for this objective. For this objective, higher bargaining 
strength reduces output, while higher bargaining costs increases output.  Perversely, 
for both exogenous and endogenous quantity models, maximising members’ prices 
does not necessarily lead to the highest average return to members.  Only for high co-
operative bargaining strength will pursing the maximising  objective lead to an 
average return to members higher that that produced by pursuing profit maximisation.  
Even in the exogenous quantity model, reducing output does not necessarily increase 
member prices.  These findings question the relevance of seeking to optimise member 
prices as an objective for members facing a bilateral monopoly structure. 
MP
MP
 
Only under the profit maximising objective do factor prices have any impact on prices 
and output levels.  Higher input prices reduce profits to members and hence should be 
avoided. For all three objectives, higher bargaining costs reduce objective values and 
hence should also be avoided.  In essence, the burden of both higher factor and 
bargaining costs are shared by co-operative members through lower returns and by the 
processor through higher market prices. 
 
In conclusion, the level of prices for all objectives and quantity in the  maximising 
endogenous quantity model, depend upon the co-operative’s relative bargaining 
strength.  Inferring from the results of strategic bargaining models, one probably 
expects this strength to be relatively low.  Given the typical financial, physical and 
MP
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human resources of investor-owned firms such as large food processors and the 
relatively small resources of farmer bargaining co-operatives, it is expected that 
members would be more impatient (less able to hold-out) in negotiations.  Further 
there is a general expectation that farmers exhibit a relatively greater degree of risk 
aversion compared to the entrepreneurial focused investor-owned corporate processor.  
The consequences of a low τ are relatively low levels for co-operative objective 
values, and market and member prices. 
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Appendix: Model Notation 
 
Y:    total output of all members 
YP :  unit price of output in the market 
MP :  unit price returned to members 
ΠC:  co-operative profits 
CS:  co-operative surplus 
ΠM:  members’ profits 
B:  co-operative fixed bargaining costs 
AB:  average bargaining costs: AB = B/Y 
C(Y,W): members’ production cost function, with input prices W 
  properties: MC =  .0,0,0,0,0,0 ><>>>> WYWWWYWYYY CCCCCC
AC:  average production costs: AC= C/Y 
TC(Y,W): total cost: TC= B + C 
ATC:  average total costs: ATC = TC/Y 
R(Y):  processor’s revenue function, with MR =  .0,0 <> YYY RR
ΠP:  processor’s profit function 
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Endnotes 
1 A list of all notation and definitions for variables appears in the appendix. All 
subscripts in this paper denote respective partial derivatives except for price, where 
the subscript distinguishes the market and member prices. The analysis assumes a 
passive co-operative and hence abstracts from issues relating to any possible conflicts 
between the co-operative and its members. Also, this paper abstracts from individual 
member differences and hence employs aggregate production quantities and average 
price returns for all members. 
 
2 This assumption implies zero costs for no trade, or no fixed costs.  For the case of 
production costs we will employ long-run costs which assume the absence of any 
fixed factors.  For the fixed bargaining costs, we assume that members’ incur 
bargaining costs only if a trade is negotiated. Effectively the co-operative is not paid 
if it fails to reach agreement for members. An alternative is to assume a fixed 
bargaining cost differential of: −= BBB 1B
2B
MP
)/()( ABARAC −
, with being the cost if agreement 
is reached and  if disagreement occurs. On the other hand, if the same fixed 
bargaining cost is also incurred in the case of disagreement, then these costs will have 
no impact on bargaining outcomes. 
 
3 Interestingly, this implies that for the and CS objectives, members’ profits can be 
negative if the level of bargaining strength is such that: <τ , where 
AC is the average production cost.  In other words even though bargaining ensures 
price cannot fall below AB it can fall below ATC. 
 
4 Comparative statics results are determined by implicit differentiation and are 
verified by numerical example. 
 
5 Figure 2 and the F functions can also be used to establish some of the relations 
between the solutions.  Comparing the profit and surplus maximising objectives: since 
MR is downward sloping and MC is positive then Y )( MΠ  < Y(CS), since  lies 
above  then  and since  lies above  then 
3F
4F )()( CSPMP MM >Π 1F 2F
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)()( CSPMP YY >Π
4F )( MP
2F 4F
)()( CSPPP MMM > )()( CSPPP YMY >
. Comparing the members’ price and surplus maximising 
objectives: since MR is downward sloping and  is positive then Y  < Y(CS), 
since both  and   are downward sloping (from the first order conditions) then 
 and .  Finally, for varying values of τ all the F 
functions shift (upwards for increasing τ) while MR and MC remain unchanged, this 
implies that the relations between output and prices for the profit and members’ price 
maximising objectives depends upon bargaining strength. 
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